Weak rule of law as an impediment to an autonomous Middle East security architecture

Countries that have weak rule of law are unlikely to respect international law

As the US surrenders its role as regional policeman for the Middle East, the best hope for the emergence of a homegrown security system lies in respect for international law. Historically, across the globe, there is a strong relationship between respect for domestic rule of law and adherence to international law. This casts a dark cloud over the prospects for successful self-rule in the region, as many Middle Eastern countries have a poor track record in rule of law.

Rule of law is a complex phenomenon whose meaning differs by academic discipline. When looking through the lens of international relations in the Middle East, rule of law is defined as a system whereby all citizens and institutions within a country – including lawmakers and leaders – are accountable to the same laws. It can be concisely restated as “nobody is above the law”.

In the 21^st century, a minor illustration is former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson being held accountable for violating social distancing rules during Covid-19, while a graver one is former US President Donald Trump going on trial for a failure to maintain the confidentiality of state secrets.

A critical ingredient for rule of law is the presence of an independent judiciary whose mandate is to uphold the laws of the land. That way, even though the head of government or head of state might possess the greatest executive power of any individual, they can still be punished for violating the restrictions that the legal system imposes.

While rule of law confers many benefits domestically, it also contributes to greater adherence to international law, for several reasons. First, rule of law is essential for ensuring that governments are accountable to their citizens. When governments are accountable to their citizens, they are more likely to comply with the law, including international law.

Further, rule of law promotes transparency and predictability in government decision-making. This transparency and predictability make it more difficult for governments to violate international law without being held accountable. Finally, rule of law helps to create a culture of respect for the law. This culture of respect for the law makes it more likely that individuals and organizations will comply with international law.

After centuries of mass slaughter, following the conclusion of the second world war, European countries established a system of international law to which they adhered. This was not the first such effort, and while many factors contributed to the success on this occasion, one of them was the strengthening of rule of law domestically within the major states compared to previous centuries.

For example, during the interwar period, Adolf Hitler’s transformation of Germany into a dictatorship unrestricted by rule of law allowed him to guide his country into a ruinous conflict in a manner that the democratically constrained government of postwar West Germany could not.

A notable historical example shown in the picture above is the trial of the English monarch Charles I. After years of behaving as an absolute king, and abusing his power to virtually bankrupt England by engaging in reckless wars, he was forcibly deposed by parliament following a bloody civil conflict. Charles I was then put on trial, and after repeatedly refusing to acknowledge the authority of the court, his opponents felt that they had no option but to order his execution to affirm the supremacy of law.

Four centuries later, rule of law is one of the reasons why wars between democracies are so rare, which is perhaps one of the most underrated benefits of pluralistic political systems. Today, when it comes to political slogans, the European Union has become the standard bearer for the twin adherence to international law and domestic rule of law because the two are intrinsically tied together.

The problem that Middle Eastern states face is that many have weak to non-existent notions of rule of law. In several countries, the legal system either offers precisely zero constraint on the head of state’s powers, or any de jure constraints are swept aside by the head of state’s de facto powers, for example if his authority is tied to his control of the armed forces.

This is reflected in the grassroots culture, where – to a normal citizen – it is a totally alien concept to imagine putting the head of state on trial for breaking a law. Due to a lifelong indoctrination program, their first instinct would be that the head of state is himself virtually omniscient, and so any nominal violation of a law must be “because the leader knows best”. Alternatively, even if they could stomach the idea of their leader committing an error, they can’t conceive of a domestic institution having the authority required to hold their leader accountable.

In such an environment, the door is wide open for the leader of a powerful country to violate international law, for example by preying on smaller countries, committing egregious human rights violations within or beyond their territory, or funding and arming proxies to destabilize adversaries. Unfortunately, this prediction has been realized numerous times in the recent history of the Middle East. If a more powerful global player such as the US is not willing to hold the violating country accountable, then an intra-regional war becomes the primary method for halting the leader from further violations.

If we narrow down to the mental model of a Middle Eastern leader, it becomes clear why one should be suspicious of a head of state who governs unconstrained by domestic rule of law. If that leader considers themselves to be above the law, and rejects the authority of any domestic court in holding them accountable, then it follows that they are unlikely to feel constrained by international laws, too.

The Middle East region is rife with cults of personality featuring leaders who really imagine themselves to be visionaries and geniuses, rather than garden variety despots reminiscent of antiquity. Under such circumstances, external violent coercion is probably the only way of keeping their behavior in check – a mechanism that is usually entails so much bloodshed and financial resources as to be virtually unworkable in the long run.

It is important to note, however, that these relationships are not absolute, and it remains logically possible for countries that have weak domestic rule of law to adhere to international law. One illustration is East Asia, which has been free of largescale interstate and quasi-interstate conflict for some time despite a patchy distribution of rule of law. Similarly, with the aid of the African Union, Africa has enjoyed a more peaceful existence than the Middle East despite uneven adherence to rule of law.

Yet, for an autonomous, homegrown security architecture to function effectively in the Middle East, it may be worth paying attention to the need for parallel domestic reforms. What is now known as the European Union actively did this throughout its postwar evolution, strengthening the whole by implementing domestic political reforms in each member state designed to reinforce rule of law.

Otherwise, whatever system emerges is likely to be brittle, with acts such as individual countries acquiring nuclear weapons disturbing the fragile balance. Given the dominance of Islam in the region, Middle Eastern leaders would do well to draw inspiration from the Quranic verse 13:11: “Indeed, Allah would never change a people’s state ˹of favor˺ until they change their own state ˹of faith˺”.